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CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION, LEGAL THEORY, AND 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
DOUGLAS R. WILLIAMS* 
Congressional power . . . is never lost, rarely taken by force, and almost always 
given away.1 
Congress, as an institution, has, over the years, given away a lot of power 
to the Presidency.2  Dr. Louis Fisher’s account of Congressional abdication 
focuses on two fundamental areas of constitutional governance: the power to 
take the nation to war and the power of the purse.3  In this essay, I consider 
first whether Congressional abdication might be viewed as a more general 
phenomenon, extending into other areas to which the Constitution assigns 
responsibility to Congress.  I then offer some thoughts on why Congress might 
abdicate its constitutional powers. 
The question of whether and why Congress abdicates power is a complex 
one.4  In Part I, I consider the distinction Dr. Fisher draws between abdication 
and delegation.  I conclude that, with respect to war and budgetary matters, 
congressional behavior is different from ordinary forms of delegation.  
Nonetheless, delegation poses some of the same general concerns that attend 
Dr. Fisher’s claim of abdication.  For that reason, it makes sense to consider 
these behaviors as linked, with an initial hypothesis that they stem from the 
same general conditions. 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. 
 1. David B. Frohnmayer, The Separation of Powers: An Essay on the Vitality Of a 
Constitutional Idea, 52 OR. L. REV. 211, 220 (1973). 
 2. And arguably to the courts, as well.  See Steven Puro, Congress-Supreme Court 
Relations: Strategies of Power, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 117 (2000).  But that’s another 
story to be told elsewhere.  See also Douglas R. Williams, Demonstrating and Explaining 
Congressional Abdication: Why Does Congress Abdicate Power?, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1013 
(1999). 
 3. Louis Fisher, War and Spending Prerogatives:  Stages of Congressional Abdication, 19 
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7 (2000) (hereinafter Stages). 
 4. Studies of congressional behavior are voluminous.  For a sampling, see DAVID R. 
MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974); MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: 
KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (1977); CONGRESS: STRUCTURE AND POLICY 
(Mathew D. McCubbins & Terry Sullivan eds., 1987); CONGRESS RECONSIDERED (Lawrence C. 
Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 5th ed. 1993); KAY L. SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, 
ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1986). 
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In Part II, I explore the question of why Congress might willingly choose 
to give away power.  In my view, partial explanations or factors of significance 
are about the best one can hope to identify in pursuing this inquiry.  I will first 
argue that, to the extent that Congress may be said to have abdicated its 
constitutional authority, a public choice analytic supplies a useful starting 
point.  On this view, individual Members of Congress will act in ways that 
maximize their opportunities for reelection.  In some circumstances, choices 
that maximize reelection opportunities may compromise institutional powers 
and responsibility.  In cases of this sort, we should expect the interests of 
individual members in advancing their own fortunes to dominate over the 
members’ interest in advancing institutional interests. 
In Part III, I introduce another important factor contributing to 
congressional abdication.  Recognizing that legal theory and decisional law 
effectively set the ground rules within which public programs may operate, I 
argue that current theory and doctrine have facilitated a shift in authority from 
Congress to the Presidency — a shift in power in which Congress has largely 
acquiesced.  This shift is broadly consistent with the observations in Part II, for 
legal theory and norms support those institutional arrangements that favor and 
promote activities by members that are likely to maximize their prospects of 
reelection. 
In Part IV, adopting a perspective that respects and values constitutional 
provision for deliberative democracy, I speculate about the effects of 
delegation and abdication.  Dr. Fisher concludes that shifts in power from 
Congress to the Presidency “undermine democracy and the rule of law.”5  
Similarly, critics of delegation insist that the practice “weakens democracy” 
and “endangers liberty.”6  My conclusions are more mixed.  In many cases, it 
may be entirely unclear from which institution — Congress or the Presidency 
— one could expect greater responsiveness to the public and opportunities for 
deliberation about public goods.  Tentatively, it appears that the Presidency 
may be more capable of fostering public dialogue about certain programs, but 
may have incentives toward autocracy in other areas of decision making.  
Somewhat unexpectedly, these observations lead back to Lou Fisher’s 
argument.  His insistence upon making a categorical distinction between 
abdication and delegation when considering the powers of war and budgets can 
be supported by examining the broad circumstances in which executive action 
may be prone to autocracy.  I conclude that in these areas, strong congressional 
involvement is likely to be necessary to ensure an effective, deliberative, and 
responsive process, while in other areas, broad delegations of authority may 
facilitate public deliberation and democratic processes. 
 
 5. Fisher, Stages, supra note 3, at 63. 
 6. DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE 
PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 99-118 (1993). 
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I. ABDICATION, DELEGATION, AND CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
In considering congressional abdication, the primary focus of Dr. Fisher’s 
work has been on war and budget powers.  In these areas, Dr. Fisher makes a 
compelling case that Congress’s behavior amounts to such a distortion of the 
constitutional structure that one could reasonably conclude that Congress has 
abdicated power, or at least, responsibility.  I, like Professor Devins, harbor 
some reservations about whether “abdication” is the appropriate term,7 but I 
also adhere to a conclusion I reached in an earlier essay: There is something 
different about the manner in which Congress approaches questions of war and 
budgets than the manner in which Congress exercises (or abdicates) its other 
constitutional authority.8  As Dr. Fisher details, in matters of war and budgets 
Congress has not only acceded to Presidential prerogatives, but has also 
concurred with Presidential interpretations of the Constitution that diminish 
congressional authority while advancing broad executive powers.9 
While it is useful to place Congress’s handling of its war and budgetary 
authority in a distinct analytic category to highlight the constitutional 
difficulties that attend these practices, it is less useful to maintain this separate 
category in attempting to explain the practices.  In other important areas of 
governance, Congress grants wholesale authority to the President and agencies 
to make national policy.  Relatedly, when Congress appears to have legislated 
with great specificity, agencies (and courts) often find “gaps” in the statutory 
language that enable the agency to refocus public programs to achieve policies 
favored by the administration, and Congress usually remains mute.  This is the 
“delegation” problem, but it bears a close family relation with Dr. Fisher’s 
description of abdication.  Dr. Fisher is unconcerned with this sort of 
Congressional behavior, because in his view this practice, unlike abdication of 
war and budgetary authority, is “necessary.” 
I do not disagree with Dr. Fisher’s conclusion, but the insistence upon 
treating abdication as something different from and more serious than 
“delegation” remains troubling.  Legal considerations aside (most forms of 
delegation are not treated as raising colorable constitutional issues),10 it is not 
self-evident that we should be more concerned with Congress’s response to 
presidential exercises of war and budgetary authority than with Congress’s 
willingness to hand over substantial lawmaking authority to the President and 
agencies - or Congress’s acquiescence in Presidential or agency policy 
initiatives - in other important areas of governance.  Dr. Fisher’s concern about 
congressional abdication is not that governmental powers are lying dormant in 
 
 7. Neal Devins, Abdication By Another Name: An Ode to Lou Fisher, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. 
L. REV. 65 (2000). 
 8. See Williams, supra note 2, at 1021-22. 
 9. Fisher, Stages, supra note 3, at 56-57. 
 10. But see Am. Trucking Ass’n v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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the face of serious need for their exercise.  Rather, his concern is that power is 
being exercised by the wrong institution and that this practice lacks 
constitutional integrity.  His concern is about separation of powers and a 
respect for the architecture of the Constitution.  In general terms, Dr. Fisher 
sees congressional abdication of war and spending powers as a threat to 
“democracy and self-government.”11 
These same concerns animate discussions of excessive delegations of 
legislative power.12 Delegation yields a governing structure in which “[m]ost 
public law is legislative in origin but administrative in content.”13  In short, 
through delegation — a practice “hardly discernible from a reading of either 
our eighteenth-century Constitution” — “we live in an administrative state.”14 
Critics of delegation insist that Congress is constitutionally responsible for 
setting the course of public policy and that the President and agencies are 
obligated to adhere to that course, not to set sail in pursuit of policy objectives 
of their own.  On this view, the constitutional architecture, by placing 
“legislative” power in the hands of Congress and creating “a single, finely 
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure,”15 ensured that lawmaking 
would be a deliberative process, subject to consensus among various 
constituencies’ representatives: the local constituencies represented in the 
House; the states represented in the Senate, and the nation as a whole 
represented by both houses and the presidency.  Critics of delegation insist that 
the practice subverts this constitutional arrangement, with untoward effects on 
the public weal.16 Delegation, on this view, raises the “constitutional 
problem . . . that Congress has not fulfilled its constitutional responsibilities.”17 
Jerry Mashaw, an acknowledged advocate of delegation,18 summarizes 
these concerns: 
The everyday, numerical, and experiential dominance of administrative over 
legislative and judicial lawmaking seems both unavoidable and troubling.  
Unavoidable because as we have demanded more from government we have 
necessarily demanded more administrators to carry out the programs and 
policies adopted.  Troubling because administrative governance affronts our 
 
 11. Fisher, Stages, supra note 3, at 7. 
 12. These concerns are classically expressed in THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF 
LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (1979). 
 13. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO 
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 106 (1997). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 439-40 (1998) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 
U.S. 919, 951 (1983)). 
 16. For a summary of these concerns, see Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 315, 319-21 (2000). 
 17. Ernest Gellhorn, Returning to First Principles, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 345, 347 (1987). 
 18. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political 
Decisions, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985). 
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common understanding of how American democracy is supposed to 
operate. . . .  Citizens . . . wonder what it means to have a “democracy” run 
importantly by unknown, “faceless” bureaucrats . . . .19 
In a more vigorous and sustained manner, David Schoenbrod charges that 
“delegation undercuts democracy, undoes the Constitution’s most 
comprehensive protection of liberty, and ultimately makes government less 
effective in achieving the popular purposes of regulatory statutes.”20 
Delegation, on this view, allows lawmakers to “fool us and . . . to mortgage the 
nation’s future to prolong their own time in power.”21  Schoenbrod is not alone 
in drawing such grave conclusions about delegation.22 
If delegation may credibly be viewed as posing such dangers to our 
constitutional form of government, it is different from abdication only by 
degree, not by kind or effect.  Indeed, for some, delegation is synonymous with 
abdication.  Theodore Lowi dramatically describes broad delegations as “the 
voluntary, self-conscious rendering of legislative power to the President, 
thence to the agencies in the executive branch” and as something perhaps even 
more serious than abdication.  For Lowi, delegation is “legiscide.”23 
There are, of course, those who defend delegation on pragmatic, 
democratic, and constitutional grounds.24  My purpose here is not to travel that 
well-worn path of debate — though I agree with the proponents of delegation 
— but simply to demonstrate that delegation shares critical features with, and 
raises the same concerns as, the arguably more extreme congressional behavior 
of abdication.  To understand why Congress abdicates, we will also have to 
understand why Congress delegates.  Both practices signal an unwillingness or 
inability on the part of Congress to assert its constitutional authority, preferring 
instead to pass that responsibility to the President and agencies.  As an intuitive 
matter, we should expect that the reasons for both behaviors are largely the 
same. 
 
 19. MASHAW, supra note 13, at 107. 
 20. SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 14. 
 21. Id. at 20. 
 22. See, e.g., Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism and 
Administrative Power, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 295 (1987); Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of 
Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982); Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, & 
Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982). 
 23. Lowi, supra note 22, at 299. 
 24. See MASHAW, supra note 13; Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the 
Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1512 (1992); David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran 
conclude that “Congress does not delegate wholesale to the Executive,” and that the delegation 
that does occur is desirable from a governance perspective.  David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, 
The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Separation of Powers: A Political Science Approach, 20 
CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 985 (1999); For the view that arguments against delegation on grounds 
that it is undemocratic are vacuous — a point to which I am sympathetic — see Dan M. Kahan, 
Democracy Schmemocracy, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 795 (1999). 
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II. INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY AND INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVES: 
REPRESENTATION, DELEGATION, AND ABDICATION 
A simple, straightforward explanation for delegation/abdication is that 
Congress is doing nothing more than supplying the public with what it has 
demanded.  This explanation is premised on the obvious: Members of 
Congress are forced to respond to constituent demands or face the prospect of 
losing their jobs.  As Madison put it in discussing the House of 
Representatives, legislators have “an immediate dependence on, and an 
intimate sympathy with, the people.”25 Absent some convincing evidence that 
the electoral system is subject to some rather severe malfunctioning due 
uniquely to delegation and/or abdication, it is difficult, or at least counter-
intuitive to suggest that congressional abdication and delegation are 
“undemocratic.”  If that is so, one would expect that the turnover rate in 
Congresses that have chosen to abdicate or delegate broadly would be very 
high indeed.  As to potential malfunctioning within the electoral system, we 
can acknowledge that a variety of collective action problems and corrupt 
practices may permit legislators to act in ways that a majority of their 
constituents disfavor.26  There is, however, no persuasive reason to expect that 
those problems are more acute in a regime where delegation and abdication are 
the norm than in a regime where they do not obtain. 
Professor Schoenbrod, does suggest that delegation enables legislators to 
hoodwink the voting public, presenting them with claims of accomplishments 
and responsibility that are basically vacuous.27 This effect, if true, 
demonstrates a malfunctioning of the electoral system the causative factor of 
which is delegation, distinguishing this factor from other problematic 
collection action scenarios.  One can appreciate Professor Schoenbrod’s efforts 
to bring delegation into the spotlight, encouraging public scrutiny and 
deliberation about this practice.  But his argument against delegation on this 
point simply proves too much.  If Schoenbrod is right that Congress can fool 
the public through delegation — and there are no strong reasons for believing 
that it can — his argument is, at best, a bit awkward.  If the public lacks the 
sophistication or interest to scrutinize legislators’ claims, it is not at all clear 
that, if this is democracy, we should want any part of it. 
As Schoenbrod himself acknowledges, “We can refuse to reelect 
legislators who make laws we dislike.”28  Thus, an engaged public that is 
 
 25. THE FEDERALIST, NO. 51, at 163 (Alexander Hamilton & James Madison) (The 
University of Chicago ed., 1952). 
 26. The literature on collective action problems is vast.  The generative text is MANCUR 
OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS  
(1965). 
 27. SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 14. 
 28. Id. 
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dissatisfied with broad forms of delegation can simply select legislators who 
will refuse to engage in such practices.  Mashaw puts this point nicely: 
A decision to go forward notwithstanding continuing ambiguity or 
disagreement about the details of implementation is a decision that the polity is 
better off legislating generally than maintaining the status quo.  Citizens may 
disagree, but they can also hold legislators accountable for their choice.  If 
citizens want more specific statutes, or fear that legislating without serious 
agreement on implementing details is dangerous, they can, after all, throw the 
bums out.29 
An unengaged, ill-informed electorate may unwittingly dislike delegation and 
be unable to see it.  This environment would free legislators from the discipline 
of accountability.  As I shall explain below, however, there is no reason to 
expect that the type of legislative behavior preferred by Schoenbrod would 
increase legislative accountability or lead to more informed decisions by the 
electorate.  But assuming Schoenbrod is right, we could simply conclude that 
the electorate is getting no more or no less than what it bargained for.  As a 
prima facie matter, I am unwilling to assign such ignorance or incapacity to the 
public, preferring a more beneficent view of the electorate’s capacities for 
understanding legislative choice, including the choice to delegate power 
broadly or to abdicate authority entirely.30  Prima facie, then, delegation is 
practiced as a congressional response to public demand. 
The idea that congressional behavior may be explained as a function of 
constituent demand is the basic idea that informs public choice theory.31  The 
 
 29. MASHAW, supra note 13, at 146-47; see also id. at 139 (quoting JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 134 (1980)): 
The . . . demand for legislative decision making as a prerequisite to accountability is . . . 
incomplete. . . . I find it difficult to understand why we do not presently have exactly the 
“clowns . . . we deserve.”  The dynamics of accountability apparently involve voters 
willing to vote upon the basis of their representative’s record in the legislature.  Assuming 
that our current representatives in the legislature vote for laws that contain vague 
delegations of authority, we are presumably holding them accountable for that at the polls.  
How is it that we are not being represented? 
 30. An interesting problem for those who would introduce the problem of “democracy” in 
support of or against delegation/abdication is the apparent lack of interest in self-rule by the 
voting public.  One source reports that “fewer than half of voting-age citizens take part in House 
elections in presidential years and fewer than 40 percent vote in off years.”  ROGER H. DAVIDSON 
& WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 97 (6th ed. 1998). 
 31. See Daniel A. Farger & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. 
L. REV. 873 (1987), reprinted in part in MAXWELL STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: 
READINGS AND COMMENTARY 5, 16 (1997): 
The core of the [public choice] models is a revised view of legislative behavior.  In place 
of their prior assumption that legislators voted to promote their view of the public interest, 
[public choice scholars] now postulate that legislators are motivated solely by self-
interest.  In particular, legislators must maximize their likelihood of reelection.  A 
legislator who is not reelected loses all the other possible benefits flowing from office. 
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theory is that, as a matter of rational choice, legislators will act in ways that 
maximize their preferences, with the dominant preference being a desire for 
reelection.32  Importantly, the basic unit of analysis for this theory is the 
individual legislator, not the institutional Congress.  Note also, that in order to 
have explanatory value, the theory does not require that every member’s 
preference for reelection will dominate that member’s other preferences — 
e.g., a preference for fiscal responsibility.  Rather, and because Congress acts 
collectively, the theory will be useful so long as members’ aggregated 
preferences for reelection dominate over members’ other aggregated 
preferences. 
Given this structure of incentives facing members of Congress, we are 
faced with the distinct prospect that legislators may act in ways that promote 
their own electoral fortunes while jeopardizing the functional role of the 
institution as a whole.  This result will obtain in circumstances where the 
action that advances individual legislators’ interests in reelection and the action 
that advances institutional interests are not the same. 
The rather vast literature on Congress tends to support the conclusion that 
individual and institutional interests will often diverge.  For example, in their 
useful work, Congress and its Members, Roger Davidson and Walter Oleszek, 
devote a lot of space to explicating a Burkean “two Congresses” thesis.33  One 
functional Congress “act[s] as a collegial body, performing constitutional 
duties and debating legislative issues.”34  The other serves as “the 
representative assemblage of 540 individuals.”35  Davidson and Oleszek 
conclude that “the Constitution and subsequent historical developments affirm 
Congress’s dual functions of lawmaker and representative assembly.  Although 
the roles are tightly bound together, they nonetheless impose separate duties 
and functions.”36  While acknowledging that members’ duties to respond to the 
insistent demands of voters and constituents is “not specifically spelled out in 
the Constitution,” Davidson and Oleszek rightly conclude that “these duties 
flow from the constitutional provisions for electing representatives and 
senators.”37 
The important insight here is that “[t]he electoral fortunes of its members 
depend less upon what Congress produces as an institution than upon the 
 
 32. For a brief discussion of this model, including its shortcomings, see Williams, supra note 
2, at 1035-44. 
 33. DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 30, at 1-37; see also Aranson et al., supra note 22, at 
43 (discussing “fundamental tension between a legislator’s role as a delegate of narrow interests 
and his role as a trustee for his district and for the nation”). 
 34. DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 30, at 4. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 6. 
 37. Id. at 5-6. 
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support and goodwill of voters hundreds or thousands of miles away.”38  
Mashaw puts the point more directly.  To voters choosing a representative, 
“the congressperson’s position on various issues of national interest is of 
modest, if any importance.  The only question is, Does he or she ‘bring home 
the bacon.’”39 
When voter support and goodwill can be nurtured by actions that are in 
derogation of Congress’s institutional interests, public choice theory predicts 
that legislators will generally choose to abandon institutional concerns in order 
to promote their individual interest in reelection.  In fact, the disjunction 
between individual incentives and institutional interests may be such that, for 
members, it “dictates a strategy of opening as much space as possible between 
themselves and ‘those other politicians’ back in Washington” — namely, the 
Congress as an institution.40  Or, as Richard Fenno aptly concludes, members 
will “run for Congress by running against Congress.”41 
Although this conclusion seems to point to a potential problem of 
governance, we should not rush from this consequence to the additional 
conclusion that it is inconsistent with the Constitution.  The Constitution does 
not require Congress to act wisely or in ways that promote the provision of 
public goods over the provision of private goods.  Rather, the Constitution 
structures exercises of power in ways that the framers hoped would promote 
public-regarding outcomes over private-regarding ones.42  Recall that the 
Constitution was designed in part on the Madisonian premise that effective 
governments are those that are structured in ways that make use of, rather than 
attempt to suppress, the self-interest of individual political leaders.43  But just 
as importantly, as Davidson and Oleszek make clear, the reason that individual 
interests may hamper institutional capacities is that the Constitution structures 
the legislative branch in ways that permit — indeed, encourage — such results. 
As I have suggested elsewhere, the framers may have been insufficiently 
attentive to the institutional effects of self-interested behavior in fashioning 
their constitutional blueprint.44  On the other hand, the provisions of Article I 
suggest (or at least support) precisely the opposite conclusion — namely, that 
the framers understood that the electoral demands placed on members would 
often require individual responses that diverged from the interests of the 
institution as a whole.  They may very well have been familiar with Burke’s 
 
 38. Id. at 4-5. 
 39. MASHAW, supra note 13, at 152. 
 40. DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 30, at 7-8. 
 41. RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 168 
(1978). 
 42. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. 
REV. 29 (1985). 
 43. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 25, at 163. 
 44. Williams, supra note 2, at 1016. 
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speech in Bristol in 1774, elaborating the dual character of representative 
government.  Burke described a popularly elected legislature both as “a 
Congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interests 
each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and 
advocates,” and as “a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, 
that of the whole — where not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to 
guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole.”45  
Perhaps less obviously, the framers may have realized that frequent elections 
would force members to consider carefully the electoral consequences of their 
actions.  As a result, members’ individual interests would serve as a sort of 
internal hedge against the tendencies of legislatures to dominate the political 
arena, lessening the threat of legislative tyranny with which the federalist 
framers were so clearly concerned.46  While entirely speculative, it may very 
well be that in structuring Congress, the framers recognized that individual and 
institutional interests would, at times, diverge and provided incentives that 
permit individual interests to dominate precisely to ensure that Congress would 
not become too powerful. 
In any event, delegation and abdication are the predictable results of the 
institutional design, for this behavior is, in a number of ways, broadly 
consistent with the general tendency of legislators to prefer actions that 
advance individual interests over institutional ones.  First, and perhaps most 
obvious, delegation and abdication do not demand nearly as much knowledge 
or information about the pertinent issues as is required to enact detailed, rule-
like legislation (at least if members deem it important to understand the effects 
of and reasons for their votes).  As a consequence, by abdicating or delegating, 
members avoid the costs of obtaining and understanding information.  Not 
only does this reduce the sheer workload of legislators, it also becomes an 
effective strategy for dealing with the vast uncertainties — both in terms of 
actual policy effects and political repercussions — that accompany many 
 
 45. Edmund Burke, Speech to Electors at Bristol, in BURKE’S POLITICS (Ross J.S. Hoffman 
& Paul Levack, eds. 1949), quoted in DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 30, at 12. 
 46. It is widely understood that the Federalist framers feared powerful legislatures.  Madison 
expressed this concern explicitly.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 157 (James Madison) (The 
University of Chicago ed., 1952) (“The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere 
of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.”); see id. (“[I]t is against the 
enterprising ambition of [the legislative] department that the people ought to indulge all their 
jealousy and exhaust all their precautions.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 25, at 
163: 
In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates.  The remedy 
for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render 
them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected 
with each other as the nature of their common functions and their dependence on the 
society will admit.  It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments 
by still further precautions. 
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forms of regulatory action.47  An added benefit is that delegation, by 
minimizing the need for information, frees up scarce resources that members 
may devote to constituent services believed to be more directly relevant to the 
members’ electoral prospects.48 
Second, delegation enables members to mediate disputes among 
conflicting constituent groups without coming down strongly on one side or 
the other.  Broad delegations often funnel the conflict over the distribution of 
benefits and burdens in public programs from the legislative to the 
administrative forum, in which incremental adjustments can be made that tend 
to lessen the hardships experienced by those who “lose” the battle for benefits 
and burdens.49  Mashaw notes, for example, that broad delegations facilitate 
both temporal and situational variances in regulatory requirements that may 
better account for the actual effects of regulation than is possible through 
legislation that eliminates the possibility of such variances by tightly 
constraining administrative discretion.50  In this manner, legislators may 
minimize the chances of alienating important constituents and thus increase 
their chances of reelection.  More generally, and especially when coupled with 
uncertainty about the effects of various policy choices, “with greater . . . 
conflict there is a stronger incentive for Congress to pass the hot potato to the 
agency by broadening the scope and instruments of delegated authority.”51 
Third, broad delegation may permit legislators to exert influence over the 
implementation of delegated authority in ways that would likely be much more 
difficult in a regime of more rule-like legislation.52  This influence may 
frequently service particular constituents’ interests, enabling members to gain 
visible credit and shift blame in ways that might be unlikely without abdication 
or delegation at the institutional level.53  As McCubbins and Schwartz argue, 
congressional oversight is less costly to members and more effective, in terms 
of electoral prospects, when undertaken in response to specific complaints 
about administrative action voiced by important constituents than when 
conducted systematically.54  To the extent that broad delegations enable 
 
 47. Mathew D. McCubbins & Talbot Page, A Theory of Congressional Delegation, in 
CONGRESS: STRUCTURE & POLICY 409, 416-18 (Mathew D. McCubbins & Talbot Page eds., 
1987). 
 48. See Aranson et al., supra note 22, at 21-2.  Epstein and O’Halloran conclude that 
delegation tends to get broader as the issues become more complex.  Epstein & O’Halloran, supra 
note 24, at 984. (“[A]s issue areas become more informationally intense, no matter how 
information is measured, more authority is delegated. . .”). 
 49. Aranson et al., supra note 22, at 33, 39. 
 50. Mashaw, Prodelegation, supra note 18. 
 51. McCubbins & Page, supra note 47, at 419. 
 52. Aranson et al., supra note 22, at 58. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: 
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, in CONGRESS: STRUCTURE & POLICY 426, 429 (1987). 
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administrators to exercise the flexibility to respond to legislators’ inquiries in 
ways that reduce friction between the agency and legislators, such delegations 
enhance legislators’ effectiveness in dealing with constituents’ complaints, 
directly increasing the likelihood of electoral success. 
Fourth, delegation may permit legislators to take action in response to 
public demand for legislation in circumstances where, if precise statutory 
standards were required, conflicts among legislators themselves might yield a 
stalemate, preventing Congress as an institution from taking any action at all.55  
In this fashion, legislators can avoid the charge of being part of a “do-nothing” 
institution. 
Finally, we should not discount the possibility that delegation may be 
viewed by legislators (and the public) as an appropriate institutional response 
to serve important public interests: 
[C]onsider a fairly complex policy area — say, airline safety — in which 
legislators are confident that the regulator’s policy goals are nearly identical to 
their own.  Delegating under such circumstances with broad discretion would 
result in outcomes close to those preferred by legislators and, by transitivity, to 
those preferred by their constituents as well. . . .  In contrast, forcing Congress 
to provide a detailed policy algorithm may result in the regulator’s having to 
implement policy that neither she nor the legislators in the enacting coalition 
would have preferred.  True, a good algorithm will deliver good policy, but 
relatively uninformed legislators may not even possess sufficient expertise to 
be sure that their road map will lead to the desired destination, rather than a 
dead end.56 
Empirical surveys support the more general conclusion that the breadth of 
delegated power “increases when it better suits legislators’ need for reelection, 
and it decreases when legislative policymaking becomes politically more 
efficient.”57 
The incentives favoring abdication in matters involving war are somewhat 
different, but basically follow the same logic.58 
The framers did not clearly seek to check these incentives by including an 
express prohibition against delegation.  Indeed, the sweeping clause, providing 
congressional authority “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution” powers conferred by the Constitution, may 
plausibly be viewed as textual evidence of an apparent unconcern for express 
statutory delegation.59  From an historical perspective, delegation has been a 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 24, at 986-87. 
 57. Id. at 985. 
 58. See Williams, supra note 2, at 1015-16. 
 59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see generally William Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress 
in Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the 
Horizontal Effect of the “Sweeping Clause,” 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 788 (1975). 
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rather consistent approach to achieving public policy objectives.60  From a 
normative perspective, delegation raises complex issues, but it does not suffice 
to declare the practice “undemocratic” and move quickly to the conclusion that 
a strong judicial stance against the practice is warranted.  These considerations 
are addressed in Part IV. 
III. LEGAL THEORY AND THE DECLINE OF CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY 
To this point, I have argued that Congress will tend to delegate/abdicate 
constitutional authority in response to public demand, measured in terms of 
how individual legislators believe prospects for reelection are affected by the 
various choices they face in exercising the authority of their offices.  In this 
part, I will argue that legal theory has contributed to the shift in power from the 
Congress to the presidency and the bureaucracy. 
A. Expansion of National Legislative Power Contributes to the Erosion of 
Congressional Authority 
The primary complaint of those who view delegation/abdication as a 
constitutional impropriety is that it corrupts the political process by enabling 
legislators to confer private benefits at public expense61 or that it facilitates 
national action by shortcutting the constitutionally-prescribed process for 
reaching a consensus on the need for such action.62  Those who share these 
views often argue that a rigorous, judicially enforced ban on broad delegations, 
while now largely a constitutional anachronism,63 (will redress) to these 
concerns.  Then-Justice Rehnquist summarized the functions of the 
nondelegation doctrine in Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American 
Petroleum Inst.,64 noting: 
[T]he nondelegation doctrine serves three important functions.  First, and most 
abstractly, it ensures to the extent consistent with orderly government 
administration that important choices of social policy are made in Congress, 
the branch of our Government most responsive to the popular will. . . .  
Second, the doctrine guarantees that.  To the extent Congress finds it necessary 
to delegate authority, it provides the recipient of that authority with an 
‘intelligible principle’ to guide the exercise of the delegated discretion. . . .  
Third, and derivative of the second, the doctrine ensures that courts charged 
 
 60. See, e.g., Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813) 
(upholding delegation to the President to impose trade restrictions); see generally Sunstein, supra 
note 16, at 322 (“[T]he practice of early congresses strongly suggests that broad grants of 
authority to the executive were not thought to be problematic.”). 
 61. See Aranson et al., supra note 22, at 37-63. 
 62. SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 117-18; Fisher, Stages, supra note 3, at 51-55. 
 63. But see American Trucking Ass’n, 175 F.3d at 1027 (holding that the EPA’s 
interpretation of the Clean Air Act effected an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power). 
 64. 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
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with reviewing the exercise of delegated legislative discretion will be able to 
test that exercise against ascertainable standards.65 
In my view, pinning hopes on the delegation doctrine to service these functions 
misses the mark or is, at the least, incomplete, masks other important factors, 
and fails to account for the current administrative law system. 
I start from an obvious premise.  The scope of permissible delegation is a 
function not only of the constraints imposed by a nondelegation principle, but 
also of how much authority Congress itself enjoys.  Put slightly differently, 
even if Congress could delegate without constraint, it could only delegate such 
authority as the institution itself may exercise.  The more power Congress has, 
the more power it may delegate.  In my view, opponents of delegation — at 
least those of a decidedly conservative cast (and most are) — are aiming at the 
wrong target, with the result that their arguments against delegation mask the 
object of their jealousy.  To take a very simple example, Schoenbrod uses the 
Clean Air Act as an example to support the sweeping conclusion that 
“‘American public bureaucracy is not designed to be effective,’ but rather to 
advance the interests of ‘those who exercise political power.’”66  But in order 
to so advance such interests, it would be necessary, first, to conclude that 
Congress - and derivatively, the bureaucracy, pursuant to delegation — was 
vested with constitutional authority to regulate activities that contribute to air 
pollution.  More specifically, it is necessary to conclude that the Clean Air Act 
— and virtually every other statute administered by an agency — is an 
appropriate exercise of Congress’s authority to regulate interstate commerce. 
While that conclusion now seems hardly worth questioning, even 
considering the Court’s recent, more restrictive reading of the commerce 
clause,67 it was not always so.  Indeed, prior to the expansive interpretation of 
the commerce clause that has been used to sustain the administrative state, it is 
likely that the courts would have treated the Clean Air Act as beyond the scope 
of congressional power, even if the delegation were deemed to be otherwise 
appropriate.68  It seems clear, however, that broad delegations and legislation 
resting on expansive interpretations of the commerce clause go hand in hand.  
Indeed, in the most famous delegation case, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, the Court concluded that the National Industrial Recovery Act, 
permitting the formulation of “codes of fair competition,” was both an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and beyond congressional 
 
 65. Id. at 685-86 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). 
 66. SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 81 (quoting Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic 
Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN 26 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 
1989)). 
 67. See, e,g, United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000). 
 68. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
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authority under the commerce clause.69  Moreover, tellingly, despite an 
occasional lawsuit raising delegation issues — all of which were 
unsuccessful70 — there apparently was virtually no mention of a “delegation 
problem” prior to the massive expansion of federal power that began with the 
New Deal. 
Had the Court adhered to the views expressed in Schechter, E.C. Knight, 
and like cases — namely, that “[c]ommerce succeeds to manufacture and is not 
part of it,”71 and that Congress may only assert its authority over activities that 
are actually in interstate commerce or that “directly affect” interstate 
commerce72 — the scope of congressional power would have remained rather 
severely limited and the subject matter of many of the existing regulatory 
programs would remain within the province of state and local governments.  
The opportunities for members of Congress to confer private (and public) 
benefits through delegation or otherwise would correspondingly be limited.  
Paradoxically, by increasing the opportunities for members to deliver benefits 
to their constituents, the courts’ expansion of congressional authority under the 
commerce clause also increased the opportunities for Congress to give away 
that authority through abdication/delegation. 
I do not want to claim too much for this effect of legal doctrine, for even 
under restrictive readings of congressional powers, the potential reach of 
federal administrative regulatory programs remained fairly extensive.73  
Nonetheless, the effect is likely substantial and correlates well with other 
features that make delegation likely.  First, the pre-New Deal interpretations of 
the commerce clause, combined with interpretations of the due process clause, 
did not prevent substantial amounts of regulation (with attendant delegation), 
but it placed certain sorts of regulation beyond congressional cognizance.  
Complex divisions of the world into “national” and “local,” as well as “public” 
and “private” spheres yielded the conclusion that much of the nation’s 
 
 69. 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935). 
 70. Schoenbrod cites three pre-New Deal cases, claiming that in each the Court struck down 
statutes “on the ground that they delegated legislative power.”  SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 
34-5 (discussing United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921); Knickerbocker Ice 
Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Washington v. W.C. Dawson, 264 U.S. 219 (1924)).  This 
reading of the cases is to some extent correct, but none of the cases involved delegation to the 
President or to administrative agencies.  Accordingly, they raise concerns that lie outside the 
scope of this essay. 
 71. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 12.  For a thorough review of the cases, see Barry Cushman, A 
Stream of Legal Consciousness: The Current of Commerce Doctrine from Swift to Jones & 
Laughlin, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 105 (1992). 
 72. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 547-48. 
 73. See, e.g., Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States; Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. 
United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (The Shreveport Rate Cases). 
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economic activity would be off-limits to federal regulation.74  As Charles 
Schultze notes, “[e]ven as late as the middle 1950s the federal government had 
a major regulatory responsibility in only four areas: antitrust, financial 
institutions, transportation, and communications.”75  Now, these areas of 
federal regulation have taken a backseat to extensive regulation concerning 
health, safety, and the environment, subjecting all but the smallest and most 
local forms of economic activity to extensive legal requirements.  With this 
expanding responsibility comes the need for delegation. 
Second, with the rise of new subject matters for regulation came the need 
to develop new forms of regulation.  The nature of the problems addressed by 
newer areas of regulation differs radically from those contained within the 
“national, public” sphere of pre-New Deal jurisprudence. 
The single most important characteristic of the newer forms of [regulation] is 
that their success depends on affecting the skills, attitudes, consumption habits, 
or production patterns of hundreds of millions of individuals, millions of 
business firms, and thousands of local units of government. . . .  The 
boundaries of the ‘public administration’ problem have leapt far beyond the 
question of how to effectively organize and run a public institution and now 
encompass the far more vexing question of how to change some aspect of the 
behavior of a whole society.76 
The combination of more opportunities for regulation, coupled with the type of 
regulation demanded, ensured that delegation would not only be desirable in 
some cases, but necessary to carry the federal presence into the places to be 
regulated.  Insisting that federal regulation take the form of statutory rules to 
be enforced by courts with little involvement by agencies — save, perhaps, a 
prosecutorial function — seems not only improbable, but a recipe for 
bureaucratizing the courts to a much greater degree than they currently are. 
It misses the point to argue that “Congress has enough time to make the 
laws,” making delegation unnecessary.77  Arguments of this sort typically rest 
on the claim that extensive federal regulation simply is not called for — state 
regulation and markets will do the job nicely and more efficiently.78  Even if 
this is right — a questionable conclusion, to be sure79 — it is not an argument 
against delegation, but instead an argument for pre-New Deal commerce 
clause jurisprudence.  For example, Schoenbrod, who advances these 
 
 74. See Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. 
CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming Fall 2000). 
 75. CHARLES L. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 7 (1977). 
 76. Id. at 12. 
 77. SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 135-52. 
 78. Id. at 136-142. 
 79. See generally Douglas R. Williams, Cooperative Federalism and the Clean Air Act: A 
Defense of Uniform Federal Regulation, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 
2001). 
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arguments against delegation, concedes that “[g]overnment cannot manage 
industries without delegation.”80  But it is management of industries (or at least 
many of the negative externalities they generate) that is precisely what is 
required by many of the newer forms of regulation. 
Faulting the courts for not applying a vigorous “nondelegation doctrine” 
fails for want of appropriate principles that will not simultaneously impose a 
judicial constraint on Congress’s ability fully to exercise its constitutional 
authority, as interpreted by post-New Deal courts.81  That is, if we deem it 
constitutionally appropriate for the federal government to regulate the subject 
matters it currently does, delegation, often very broad, is the inevitable result. 
Consider in this respect, the Court’s decision in Industrial Union 
Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute,82 commonly known as 
the Benzene case.  A plurality of the Court concluded that Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) had impermissibly interpreted a statute to 
require the agency to impose strict limits on the extent of toxic chemical 
exposures — in this case, benzene — experienced by employees without a 
prior finding that existing exposure levels posed a “significant risk” to the 
employees’ health.  The agency concluded that exposure to benzene was linked 
to certain forms of cancer, but could not identify a level at which the linkage 
between exposure and cancer could be definitively ruled out — that is, benzene 
is a pollutant that exhibits no “threshold” level below which risks to human 
health can be confidently ruled out.  On the agency’s view, once this risk to 
health had been identified, whether “significant” or otherwise, the statute 
mandated that the risk be eliminated or reduced to the extent “feasible.”  The 
Court viewed this interpretation of OSHA’s statutory authority as much too 
expansive. 
The Court’s decision in Benzene is perhaps sensible, but its reasoning is 
confounding.  The Court opined that if the agency was right about what the 
statute required, the legislation would grant the agency such sweeping 
authority over American industry that it would constitute an unconstitutional 
delegation of legislative power.83  But this is an incorrect, or at least highly 
novel, reading of the nondelegation doctrine.  It shifts the ground of concern 
from the question whether Congress had resolved the important policy 
questions when it enacted the statute to the question whether the extent of 
regulation would too severely disrupt the economic status quo.  If the agency 
 
 80. Id. at 140. 
 81. See Peter H. Schnuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 
CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 792-93 (1999) (Vigorous nondelegation doctrine is “a prescription for 
judicial supervision of both the substance and forms of legislation and hence of politics and 
public policy, without the existence of even the possibility of any coherent, principled, or 
manageable judicial standards.”). 
 82. 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
 83. Id. at 646. 
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was right that the statute mandated the result it reached, the legislation would 
not be unconstitutional for want of a limiting statutory mandate that effectively 
constrained the agency’s policy choices.  It would simply represent a choice by 
Congress to exercise its commerce powers in an extraordinarily aggressive 
manner, based on the premise that health risks to American workers should be 
reduced wherever feasible, regardless of the relationship between the gains in 
health protection and the costs of achieving such gains.  The problem in 
Benzene was not one of delegated “legislative” power, but of delegated 
“administrative” power to work the legislative will.  This is not a problem to 
which the nondelegation doctrine is responsive; it is a problem — if at all — 
associated with the scope of Congress’s substantive legislative jurisdiction.  
The Court’s invocation of the nondelegation doctrine to substitute its own, far 
narrower reading of the agency’s statutory authority for that offered by the 
agency masks this, more likely basis for judicial concern about the agency’s 
actions. 
Critics of delegation are also strangely unattentive to other ways in which 
administrative discretion can have significant impacts on policy.  We enjoy a 
common law system in which nice adjustments to legal obligations are made 
by distinguishing factual predicates.  In light of that practice, it is unlikely that 
a reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine would squeeze discretion out of the 
system.  It is much more likely that the discretion would be shifted from the 
(usually) highly visible and indirectly accountable (via presidential 
accountability) agency proceedings to less visible prosecutorial processes and 
largely unaccountable judicial processes.  It is hardly clear that, given the 
enormous discretion enjoyed by prosecutors84 and the courts — particularly on 
matters of remedy85 — that a vigorous nondelegation doctrine would 
accomplish any of its recognized purposes. 
Once the expansive powers of Congress were released from the shackles of 
limiting judicial interpretation, it is not surprising that the delegation doctrine 
fell into desuetude.  If the only effective limits on the matters to which 
congressional authority extends were those imposed by electoral constraints, a 
“substantial effects” linkage to interstate commerce, and a flimsy “rational 
basis” standard of review,86 why should the courts, on the basis of nothing 
more than a debatable constitutional inference, attempt to contain this power 
by invoking delegation principles?  How were courts to distinguish the 
question of whether Congress had made sufficiently specific policy choices in 
 
 84. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
 85. See Weinberger v. Romerco-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982). 
 86. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (“[R]egulatory 
legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional 
unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to 
preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis.”). 
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delegating power to agencies from the question of whether the subject matter 
of the legislation was appropriate for federal intervention?  Benzene shows that 
the questions may be quite difficult to keep analytically separate.  But even if 
the delegation doctrine were capable of being confined to an inquiry 
concerning whether Congress had made sufficiently clear policy choices, how 
are courts to discern the range of possible policy options, much less whether 
the legislative choice was “specific”?87 
Rather than viewing delegation as an evasion of congressional 
responsibility, broad delegations of authority to administrative institutions 
might be explained, at least in part, as a responsible congressional choice to 
extend the reach of federal power to deal with pressing social and economic 
problems.  A charge of  “abdication” on the part of Congress for such 
responses would seem misplaced. 
B. The Routinization of Administrative Law and the Ascendance of 
Administrative Authority. 
Aside from broadly interpreting Congress’s constitutional authority, and 
thus inviting Congress to delegate broadly, the courts (with legislative 
assistance) have developed a now fairly routinized body of administrative law 
to review the exercises of discretionary power by the President, when acting 
through agencies,88 as well as exercises of such discretion by agencies pursuant 
to direct legislative grants of authority.  The effects of such review upon 
Congress’s willingness to delegate broadly are difficult to discern as an 
empirical matter.  Nonetheless, there is some intuitive appeal to Judge 
Leventhal’s observation in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA: “Congress has been willing to 
delegate its legislative powers broadly — and courts have upheld such 
delegation — because there is court review to assure that the agency exercises 
the delegated power within statutory limits, and that it fleshes out objectives 
within those limits by an administration that is not irrational or 
discriminatory.”89 
Subject to the fairly recent innovations discussed below, legal theory thus 
treats administrative action more as implementation than invention.  Under 
highly elastic standards of review such as the Administrative Procedure Act’s 
“substantial evidence” and “arbitrary and capricious” standards, the courts 
have encouraged Congress and the public to treat administrative action as 
subject to the rule of law, and not as policy development and implementation 
 
 87. On this view, see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(nondelegation doctrine not susceptible to judicial enforcement); Richard B. Stewart, Beyond 
Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 324-28 (1987). 
 88. The authority of the courts to review exercises of presidential discretion remains 
somewhat limited.  See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994). 
 89. 541 F.2d 1, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
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in which political considerations hold sway.  Moreover, Congress has become 
quite adept at loading up with exacting procedural requirements statutes 
otherwise containing broad grants of discretion.  Such procedural requirements 
make the exercise of agency power quite cumbersome, and may be an effective 
means of controlling administrative discretion. 
A prime example of this approach is the EPA’s authority to regulate 
chemicals under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).90  Two examples 
of the agency’s attempt to implement this statute are telling.  McCubbins and 
Page offer this anecdote: 
Under section 4 of the act, EPA must promulgate test rules for those chemicals 
that it requires to be tested.  Such tests are used to generate information about 
the health and environmental effects of the new chemical.  The chemical 
manufacturing firms have to pay for the tests.  Procedural safeguards were put 
into TSCA to prevent EPA from requiring tests that were redundant or did not 
produce useful information.  Indeed, in the case of one of EPA’s first 
“priority” chemicals, chloromethane, these procedural requirements were 
interpreted so strictly by the agency that it spent several hundred thousand 
dollars and several years writing the test rule . . . .  The cost of writing a rule 
requiring testing was several times the cost of performing the test.91 
Under section 6 of the same statute, EPA engaged in a ten-year effort to 
develop a record sufficient to support a phased ban of asbestos-containing 
products, only to be met with a judicial conclusion that the agency had not 
jumped through all the hoops Congress had placed in the path of effective 
regulation.92 
These examples illustrate that broad delegations of substantive authority do 
not necessarily yield an environment in which agencies enjoy broad, unfettered 
discretion.  They also provide a sense of the effects on agency decision making 
of the propensity of courts to scrutinize closely agency action for procedural 
shortcomings.  This form of review, what Jerry Mashaw describes as 
“proceduralized rationality review,”93 is a staple of modern administrative 
law.94  Faced with judicial demands to explain their actions in exacting detail 
and to respond to comments from the public, it is not unusual for notices of 
final rulemakings to run to tens and sometimes hundreds of pages in the 
Federal Register.  Agencies have become familiar with judicial demands and 
have structured their decision making processes in ways that minimize the 
opportunities for successful judicial challenges.  Knowing this, Congress can 
 
 90. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601- 92 (1994). 
 91. McCubbins & Page, supra note 47, at 418. 
 92. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1229 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 93. MASHAW, supra note 13, at 178. 
 94. See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prod. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977). 
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structure its delegations in ways that avoid taking sides on controversial issues, 
but nonetheless impose significant constraints on agencies.95 
Because the well-developed system of judicial review now functions as 
both an internal and external check on agency decision making processes, it 
has largely supplanted the need for a nondelegation doctrine, at least with 
respect to two of the three functions typically assigned to the doctrine — 
namely, cabining administrative discretion and ensuring meaningful judicial 
review.  Indeed, in modern incantations of the nondelegation dotrine, it is these 
two concerns that have purportedly justified its continued application.  In 
American Trucking Association, Inc. v. EPA,96 the D.C. Circuit invoked the 
nondelegation doctrine to hold that EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act 
violated the nondelegation doctrine not because Congress had legislated too 
broadly, but instead because the agency had failed to impose upon its statutory 
authority a constraining construction that effectively provided determinate 
limits on the agency’s discretion.97  The court acknowledged that this sort of 
application of the nondelegation doctrine did not ensure that Congress makes 
important policy choices, but expressed little or no concern with that 
consequence.98 
The decision in American Trucking is dubious, if for no other reason than 
that it invokes constitutional law to yield a conclusion that could be supported 
independently on non-constitutional grounds — namely, a standard application 
of limiting administrative law principles.  Indeed, it seems quite clear that the 
decision simply substitutes a constitutional howitzer for what could have been 
accomplished with an administrative law pea-shooter.  To expand upon a 
concept recently advanced by Professor Sunstein — who argues that 
nondelegation principles inform several canons of construction that deny to 
agencies decisional authority over certain matters99 — we might credibly view 
our administrative law system as an effective substitute for two of the three 
 
 95. On the interplay between broad substantive delegations and procedural requirements, see 
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functions performed by the nondelegation doctrine.  This embryonic notion 
needs further development, but space or time do not permit it here. 
American Trucking’s lack of concern with Congress’s failure to make the 
hard policy choices is broadly consistent with the work of the federal courts 
over the past several decades.  These courts have showed considerably more 
sophistication about notions of accountability and democratic values.  This is 
manifested in the development of doctrine that views agency policymaking 
neither as illegitimate nor as a matter of especial judicial concern. 
The most dramatic example of this doctrinal pathway is the approach to 
reviewing agency interpretations of law set forth in the Court’s decision in 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.100  This decision 
has been described as a decision that “dominates modern administrative 
law.”101  Chevron holds that in reviewing agency action, courts must defer to 
agency interpretations of their own authority in the absence of clear legislative 
direction or unless the agency’s view is unreasonable.102  This is, as Professor 
Sunstein notes, “an emphatically prodelegation canon, indeed it is the 
quintessential prodelegation canon.”103 
Remarkably, the Chevron Court perceived nothing akin to a delegation 
problem in declaring that policy decisions are properly entrusted to 
administrative agencies.  In the Court’s words: 
[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities 
may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent 
administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments.  While agencies 
are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is 
entirely appropriate for this political branch of the government to make such 
policy choices - resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either 
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency 
charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.104 
Chevron thus underlines the centrality of administrative processes in projecting 
the course of national regulatory policy, broadly affirming a broad shift in 
authority from Congress to the Executive branch.105  Not only does it confirm 
the legitimacy of delegation, but also de-links such legitimacy from Judge 
Leventhal’s notion that delegation depends almost entirely on the effectiveness 
of judicial review in cabining agency discretion.  A new source of legitimacy 
— presidential accountability — supplies the necessary comfort to inspire 
judicial acceptance of broad delegations of power.  This sentiment was echoed 
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in Sierra Club v. Costle.106  There, the court was unconcerned that it was 
“possible that undisclosed Presidential prodding may direct an outcome . . . 
different from the outcome that would have obtained in the absence of 
Presidential involvement,” so long as the outcome could otherwise be defended 
on the rulemaking record.107  Put another way, it is entirely legitimate that 
agency decisions be premised on political considerations, not simply on the 
application of “neutral” agency expertise in service of clearly articulated policy 
choices made by Congress.108 
In a like vein, the courts have eagerly expanded the range within which 
administrative discretion may freely run riot.  The chief doctrinal points of 
departure for this expansion have been newly discovered content in the 
“committed to agency discretion” exception to the Administrative Procedure 
Act’s generous provisions for judicial review109 and “standing” requirements 
offered up as interpretations of Article III of the Constitution’s requirement 
that the judicial power extend only to “cases or controversies.”110  Combined, 
these doctrinal commitments have yielded a small, but significant space within 
which presidential and agency decisions may be made without fear of any 
judicial scrutiny. 
The maturation of administrative law has thus provided an environment in 
which courts have made a general peace with broad congressional delegations 
of authority.  For the public, this visibile legitimation of delegation and 
abdication have pushed the basic constitutional issues far into the background.  
The resulting environment minimizes the costs of delegation for members of 
Congress, creating incentives for continued adherence to the practice. 
C. Restricting Congressional Control 
At the same time that courts have become quite tolerant of Congress’s 
penchant for broad delegations of authority to agencies, they have also been 
considerably more intolerant of arrangements through which Congress has 
attempted to retrieve or reassert some of the authority it has delegated.  The 
key decision in this respect is INS v. Chadha, in which the Court declared 
unconstitutional a “legislative veto” provision contained in the Immigration 
and Nationality Act.111  Chief Justice Burger’s opinion for the Court walks a 
fine line that decisively tilts in favor of delegation.  The crux of the opinion 
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lies in the Court’s conclusion that the legislative veto exercised by the House 
in that case “was essentially legislative in purpose and effect.”112  In other 
words, the veto was an exercise of lawmaking power, the procedures for which 
— bicameral approval and presentment to the President — are prescribed in 
Article I of the Constitution.  Because the veto did not follow these prescribed 
procedures, it is unconstitutional.  The tension between this conclusion and the 
regulatory program to which it is addressed is revealed clearly by Justice 
White’s dissent: 
If Congress may delegate lawmaking power to independent and executive 
agencies, it is most difficult to understand Article I as prohibiting Congress 
from also reserving a check on legislative power for itself.  Absent the veto, 
the agencies receiving delegations of legislative or quasi-legislative power may 
issue regulations having the force of law without bicameral approval and 
without the President’s signature.  It is thus not apparent why the reservation of 
a veto over the exercise of that legislative power must be subject to a more 
exacting test.113 
The rather peculiar formalism at work in Chadha - namely, that a House 
decision to veto an order granting relief from deportation is “legislative,” while 
the order itself, made by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, is not 
“legislative” in the same sense - illustrates the extent to which delegation is 
now viewed by the courts as a normal incident of the regulatory process. 
D. Legal Theory and Congressional Delegation: A Summary 
It would be too strong to conclude that the pockets of jurisprudence 
described above explain delegation or bear some tight causal relation to the 
practice.  My point is a more modest one.  Generous judicial interpretations of 
congressional power under the commerce clause, the routinization of 
administrative law and consequent expansion of executive authority, and tight 
restrictions on some congressional efforts to control administrative behavior all 
create an environment in which the expectation is that Congress will delegate 
broadly, with little or no questioning of its constitutional authority to do so.  As 
Cynthia Farina has argued, 
The commitment to pervasive intervention in the economic and social order 
that has vastly increased the level of extant federal power, the implementation 
of this commitment through broad delegations of power to entities outside 
Congress . . ., and the structural and customary factors that favor the President 
in any struggle for control of the regulatory bureaucracy have coalesced to 
create a persistent and decided tilt toward presidential dominance of large 
sections of domestic policy.114 
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We may add to these observations Dr. Fisher’s important points about 
presidential dominance of military affairs.  The result is a governing system in 
which what the President and the executive branch deem to be appropriate 
policy will often trump congressional views to the contrary.  In the next part, I 
briefly speculate about the implications of this state of affairs for deliberative 
democratic governance. 
IV. ABDICATION, DELEGATION AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
As noted above, both Dr. Fisher, in his discussion of abdication, and critics 
of delegation make strong claims that the practices that they respectively 
address subvert democratic governance.  Much of what I’ve said in the 
previous sections casts serious doubts on such claims, but in this Part, I will 
address these claims directly.  My conclusion is that Dr. Fisher is more nearly 
right than critics of delegation, although confident conclusions on these issues 
are largely elusive. 
My own viewpoint is that pinning the wisdom of governing practices on 
some criteria of legitimacy, such as “democracy,” are largely meaningless 
outside the content and effect of particular programs.115  For as Professor 
Kahan has observed, “democracy” is an essentially contested concept, meaning 
very different things to different people — disputes of meanings that cannot be 
resolved by resort to logical argumentation.116  I thus agree with his conclusion 
that a more productive approach to questions of delegation should replace 
rhetorical appeals to “democratic self-rule” or other catchy soundbites.  On this 
view, we should “ask[] not which conception of democracy and corresponding 
position on delegation are ‘best’ in the abstract, but which make the most sense 
in a particular regulatory setting, given the values and interests at stake there” 
— in other words, “whether delegation is desirable is decided locally, not 
globally.”117  Indeed, arguments from democracy often function as 
conversation stoppers, used to preclude inquiry into the actual functioning of 
particular incidents of the general practices under discussion. 
With these cautionary opening positions, I will now proceed to violate 
them by pitching my views on delegation at a fairly high level of abstraction.  
My point here is not to be conclusive, but to provide a framework in which 
more particularized inquiry may proceed.  My broad conclusions are that 
congressional delegation of routine regulatory programs is, at worst, neutral 
from the standpoint of deliberative democracy, but that congressional 
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abdication of war and budgetary authority are in derogation of deliberative 
democratic processes. 
These conclusions are based largely on the work of Jerry Mashaw, who has 
put forward a most convincing case in favor of broad congressional delegations 
of policymaking authority to administrative agencies.118  Before proceeding to 
the affirmative case for delegation, however, it is useful first to consider the 
negative case against attempts to preclude delegation through judicially-
imposed constraint. 
Assume that Congress were constrained to act within the confines of a 
vigorous nondelegation doctrine.  How would public programs likely function 
in such an environment?  Would “discretion” over how statutory programs are 
to be implemented be eliminated or substantially reduced, thus ensuring that 
congressional choices are actually respected and implemented?  It is doubtful.  
As Mashaw argues: 
Squeezing discretion out of a statutory-administrative system is . . . so difficult 
that one is tempted to posit a “Law of Conservation of Administrative 
Discretion.”  According to that law, the amount of discretion in an 
administrative system is always constant.  Elimination of discretion at one 
choice point merely causes the discretion that had been exercised there to 
migrate elsewhere in the system.119 
We may go farther.  The places within the system to which discretion may 
migrate under a regime informed by strong nondelegation rules are likely to be 
the least visible, and thus, the most difficult to oversee and the most immune 
from public scrutiny.  For example, imagine the leanest possible administrative 
system: administration is limited to prosecutorial functions — civil and 
criminal enforcement of the rules Congress enacts — and private enforcement 
predominates.  Who gets prosecuted and the terms on which disputes are 
resolved are likely to be subject to the unstructured discretion of prosecutors 
and private parties.  Many disputes may never be publicly resolved, but settled 
on terms known only to the disputants.  The actual functioning of the programs 
Congress enacts may thus be radically different in practice than in the statute 
books.  And even in disputes that are resolved by the courts, how can we be 
sure that courts will, in applying statutory mandates, adhere to the purposes 
and policies Congress has presumably selected?  Even assuming that 
“interpretation” of statutes is not a practice inherently informed by the views of 
the interpreter — a most curious idea — it is nonetheless crystal clear that 
remedies for statutory violations are largely discretionary with the courts,120 
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yielding an overall regulatory system that is virtually suffused with discretion.  
And these matters are largely invisible to both Congress and the electorate. 
Assume counterfactually that all possible discretion could be eliminated 
through precisely worded statutory mandates addressed both to administrators 
and the courts.  Would the result comport with basic democratic aspirations?  
Hardly.  The likely result would be “wonderfully wooden administrative 
behavior,” which, “on that ground alone [would] be highly objectionable.”121  
An important, and largely uncontested (I think) value associated both with 
rule-of-law notions and deliberative democratic rule is the sense that like cases 
be treated alike and that relevant differences in context should yield up 
different legal outcomes.  The basic notion here is that “justice” is largely a 
contextual matter, requiring nuanced attention to and deliberation about the 
manner in which legal outcomes are likely to comport with the overall 
purposes of the governing legal mandates.  This approach is suffused with 
discretion and informs our basic commitment to a “common law” method of 
dispute resolution, which invites arguments through which prior outcomes can 
be distinguished and harmonized by appeals to more general — but certainly 
less determinate — principles. 
Of course, critics of delegation may be more comfortable in a regime 
where judicial discretion supplants administrative discretion to the greatest 
extent possible.  Prima facie, however, if this is an integral part of the case 
against delegation, it is hard to connect that case with anything that looks like 
“democracy.”  Judges are, after all, the least accountable political actors in our 
system of governance. 
The affirmative case for delegation from the perspective of deliberative 
democracy emphasizes several key points.  First, the administrative law system 
with its norms of public participation and provision for meaningful judicial 
review provide opportunities for decision makers to adjust the demands of 
regulatory programs to better fit the actual, “on-the-ground” circumstances to 
which they are applied, even as these circumstances vary across space and 
time.  A strong form of nondelegation would preclude such nice adjustments, 
for “the high transaction costs of specific legislation will give an enormous 
advantage to the status quo, and the status quo will be susceptible to change [or 
adjustment] only by a statute of the same kind.”122 
Second, while administrators are not directly accountable to the public, the 
president — who is constitutionally charged with the duty to see that laws are 
faithfully executed123 — is directly accountable to the electorate.  Schoenbrod, 
acknowledging this, rests his “delegation is anti-democratic” argument on the 
notion that legislators are more accountable for the policy decisions they make 
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than is the President for decisions made by administrative agencies.  He states 
that “accountability through the president matters less than accountability 
through Congress and, whatever the potential worth of presidential 
accountability might be, delegation diminishes its value.”124  This is so, the 
argument goes, because the president’s responsibility for any one particular 
agency policy would be “diluted by the electorate’s concern about activities in 
other areas such as national defense, foreign affairs, law enforcement, and so 
on.”125  By contrast, because legislators are voted in from districts in which 
“there are likely to be a limited number of issues of particular local interest,”126 
public attention will be more focused on legislative activity. 
There are number of reasons to question this logic.  First, it is precisely on 
issues “of particular local interest” that legislators are unlikely to delegate, 
preferring instead to push for the favored position in order to gain credit.127  
Delegation is most likely the product of intense conflict among constituencies 
— a circumstance in which a delegation allows legislators to blame agencies 
for adverse constituent effects, while at the same time claiming credit for 
delivering the goods to benefited constituencies. 
Second, and somewhat in tension with the first point, it is not clear why 
constituents, particularly those that are politically active and engaged, will not 
understand some forms of delegation for what they are — shirking of 
responsibility to make the “hard policy choices.”  If voters can be duped by 
delegations in the manner anti-delegation scholars suggest, it is not apparent 
why we would want more “democracy,” for that would simply ensure that 
decisions are being made by individuals who probably don’t understand what it 
is they are supporting.  A more generous view of the voting public’s political 
wisdom would suggest that, in terms of democratic values, delegations are 
basically neutral.  Many voters who would prefer legislated “rule” statutes may 
be willing to settle for a broad delegation to an agency if the alternative is no 
legislation at all.  Similarly, those who would prefer no legislation as an 
alternative to a legislated rule statute will presumably make their preferences 
known at the ballot box. 
Third, the conclusion Schoenbrod reaches about presidential accountability 
might with equal force be applied to Congress.  If the electorate is only 
concerned about a limited number of issues of particular local interest, they are 
most unlikely to pay any attention to what their representatives do with respect 
to other issues.  We may expect that issues of “particular local concern” will 
vary from district to district and from state to state.  Thus, representatives will 
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advance a variety of legislative proposals to effectively address these issues.  If 
Schoenbrod is right, we may expect that members of Congress can cast their 
votes for legislation important to the nation as a whole, but of no “particular 
local interest,” without fear of electoral accountability.  It is not clear why this 
advances a stronger form of democratic self-rule than does broad delegations 
to agencies whose decisions of national importance must be defended by the 
President to a national constituency. 
Finally, Schoenbrod’s logic ignores the debilitating effects of 
congressional action that is responsive only to issues of particular local 
concern.  This would be a Congress who is concerned mostly about, and will 
be judged only on, its ability to deliver the goods to local constituencies.  
Schoenbrod’s nondelegation argument may, thus, be a recipe for pork barrel 
politics.  As Mashaw puts it: 
Assume . . . the voter chooses a representative for that representative’s 
effectiveness in supplying governmental goods and services to the local 
district, including the voter.  The representative is a good representative or a 
bad representative depending upon his or her ability to provide the district with 
at least its fair of governmental largesse.  In this view, the congressperson’s 
position on various issues of national interest is of modest, if any, importance.  
The only question is, Does he or she “bring home the bacon.”128 
If this is right, nondelegation may result in a Congress that is particularly 
responsive to powerful local interests, but unresponsive to the electorate as a 
whole.  One recalls President Roosevelt’s remarks in vetoing the Walter-Logan 
bill, an administrative procedure act that would have severely constrained 
administrative power: 
Wherever a continuing series of controversies exist between a powerful and 
concentrated interest on one side and a diversified mass of individuals, each of 
whose separate interests may be small, on the other side, the only means of 
obtaining equality before the law has been to place the controversy in an 
administrative tribunal.129 
All this is not to say that Schoenbrod is wrong to claim that there are 
dangers associated with delegation.  But even if we think congressional 
involvement in making policy is critical to effective democratic rule, his 
delegation-is-anti-democratic argument fails to consider seriously 
congressional influence on the choices agencies make in implementing their 
delegated powers.  Congress’s policy preferences may effectively control 
bureaucratic behavior, even if those preferences are not formally expressed in 
statutes.  Through oversight, Congress may wield significant and continuing 
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influence over administrative policy long after its formal legislative powers 
have been exercised.  The effectiveness of such oversight is an empirical issue.  
Studies of congressional influence over administrative behavior have yielded 
mixed results.130 
The studies that suggest strong congressional influence over administrative 
policy do raise a possible problem with broad delegations, but it is not clear 
that it is a problem of democratic accountability.  In arguing for the 
effectiveness of congressional oversight of agencies, the focus of study is 
typically on the influence of individual members or committees, not the 
Congress as an institution.131  The delegation problem, then, is not one 
involving open-ended authority on the part of the President and agencies to 
make national policy.  Instead, it may serve as a technique through which 
members of Congress, through “fire alarm” oversight, respond in a more 
particular fashion to concerns expressed by their constituents than would be 
possible if Congress, as an institution, were to attempt to do so.132  In these 
circumstances, matters of “particular local concern” are addressed quite 
directly by legislators’ actions, but the results may be ones that the public as a 
whole would reject. 
Matters are a bit different on questions of wars and budgets.  The 
phenomenon addressed by Dr. Fisher clearly does not implicate many of the 
critical saving features that are often advanced in support of broad delegations.  
Chief among these omissions is the utter lack of structure associated with 
presidential decision making on matters of war and budgets.  In this area, there 
is virtually no opportunity for public participation and there is, of course, no 
serious judicial demand for justification and explanation of the choices 
presidents make on these matters.  Presidents do, of course, typically take their 
cases for wars and budgets to the people, but the actual decisional processes 
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are shrouded in secrecy, with presidents enjoying a virtual monopoly of 
information on matters of war and a battery of dubious studies to support the 
most rosy projections associated with specific budget choices. 
The temptation for presidents to place their own electoral interests and 
desire for “immortal fame” above public interests in these two areas of 
governance are notorious to the point of satire — witness, the popularized and 
utterly cynical view of presidential warmaking represented by Hollywood in 
the movie Wag the Dog.  Likewise, presidential elections of late have become 
contests for fiscal responsibility, with largely unsubstantiated claims that we 
can enjoy massive tax cuts without feeling any pinch to the domestic programs 
of critical importance to the electorate as a whole. 
CONCLUSION 
Congressional power in the modern age has waned to a considerable 
degree, causing us to reevaluate the constitutional structure of our governing 
institutions.  The phenomenon is much broader than the case for abdication 
advanced by Dr. Fisher as to war and budgetary powers.  At the same time, we 
should not quickly conclude that current arrangements present us with a 
constitutional crisis of large proportions.  Routine exercises of legislative 
power to create public programs the content of which is largely administrative 
in origin is not self-evidently a bad thing, nor is it necessarily inconsistent with 
our basic democratic aspirations.  Yes, there are dangers attending this 
practice, but governance to be effective and consistent with democratic 
aspirations depends critically on vigilant and discerning scrutiny by the 
electorate of our leaders’ actions.  If delegation is inconsistent with our 
aspirations for government, we should insist that the practice be halted by 
voting the rascals out.  There is, however, no reason to believe that the current 
administrative state is not as responsive, or perhaps even more responsive, to 
public demand than a regime of strict nondelegation would be. 
On war and budgetary matters, things may be quite different.  I agree with 
Dr. Fisher that current congressional behavior in these matters is cause for 
concern.  Congress must meet its constitutional responsibilities, and in wars 
and budgets, its actions have fallen considerably short of that responsibility.  
Let us hope that Dr. Fisher’s pleas for reform will make a lasting contribution 
to our democratic form of government. 
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